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IPRs in China—Market-Oriented Innovation
or Policy-Induced Rent-Seeking?
Kung-Chung Liu, Chuntian Liu, and Ji Huang
1 The Official Statements
1.1 Recap of the NIPS
After years of deliberation,1 the State Council of China issued on 5 June 2008 the
National Intellectual Property Strategy (NIPS) as the fourth national strategy after
the “Strategy of Sustainable Development (1995),” the “Education and Science
Strategy to Revive the State (1996),” and the “Talent Strategy to Strengthen the
State (2002).” The purpose of the NIPS is to help “improve China’s capacity for
independent innovation and aid in efforts to make China an innovative country. It
also aims at increasing the market competitiveness of Chinese enterprises, strength-
ening the core competitiveness of the country, and finally facilitating China’s
further opening up to the world, and leading to a win-win situation for China and
the rest of the world.”
The NIPS sets itself the following short-term strategic goals, which are to be
achieved within 5 years: The level of the self-relied IPRs will be higher by a large
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margin and there will be a greater quantity of IPRs; China will rank among the
advanced countries in terms of annual number of invention patents granted to
Chinese applicants, and greatly increase the number of overseas patent applications
filed by Chinese applicants; a number of world-famous brands will emerge; the
proportion of the GDP accounted for by the value of core copyright industries will
be greatly increased; China will own a number of high-quality plant variety rights
and high-level integrated circuit layout designs; trade secrets, geographical indi-
cations, genetic resources, traditional knowledge and folklores will be effectively
protected and reasonably utilized; a number of preponderant enterprises with
famous brands, core IPRs and rich experiences in utilizing the IPR system will
emerge; the protection of IPRs will be significantly improved, its expense sub-
stantially decreased, its infringement significantly reduced and its abuse effectively
curbed.
The long-term strategic goals envisioned by the NIPS are as follows: “By 2020,
China will become a country with a comparatively high level of creation, utili-
zation, protection and management of IPRs. The legal environment for IPRs shall
be significantly improved; market entities will be well-versed in the creation, utili-
zation, protection and management of IPRs; public awareness of IPRs will be
greatly increased; the quality and quantity of the self-relied IPRs will be able to
effectively support China’s effort to become an innovative country; and the role of
the IPR system in promoting economic development, culture prosperity and social
progress in China will become apparent.”
1.2 Overall Performance Evaluation of the NIPS since
Implementation 8 Years Ago
In 2013, the Inter-ministerial Joint Committee on the Implementation of the NIPS
has assessed the overall performance of the NIPS 6 years after the launch of the
NIPS: “China managed to stay afloat during the Financial Tsunami that engulfed
the globe, and more enterprises have successfully taken part in international market
competition.” “Relying on its independent IPRs, China has realized a moon expe-
dition, developed the deep sea submarine, launched the BeiDou navigation satellite
system, formed a carrier brigade, dominated 4G communications, and is marching
into the high-speed railroad industry, among a series of breakthroughs and new
progress, thereby catching attention world over.” “With the implementation of the
NIPS, the social environment for further implementing the NIPS and building an
IP-strong country has been established.”2
In “The Action Plan for 2014–2020 to Further Implement the NIPS” (“The
Action Plan for 2014–2020”) promulgated by the State Council on January
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5, 2015, it is noticed that the short-term strategic goals of the NIPS have been
achieved by and large.
1.3 The Development of IPR Industries in China
1.3.1 Patent-Related Industries
With an annual growth rate of 20%, China ranks as the world number one in filed
applications for three kinds of patents, since 2010. There has been a sevenfold
increase of filed applications in high-tech industries, and domestic applicants make
up 50% of the applicants for invention patents.2
In 2012, patent applications filed by Chinese entities through PCT reached
19,926, ranking number 4 in the world, a more than threefold jump from 2008,
when the total applications numbered 6081; international applications entering
Chinese National Phase reached 70,221, among which 69,693 were for invention
patent; there were 3.2 invention patents per 10,000 inhabitants, and the accumu-
lated invention patents reached 435,000.3 The above-mentioned figures kept grow-
ing in 2013, and it suffices to mention that the number of invention patents per
10,000 inhabitants further increased to 4.02. The ZTE Corporation filed the most
PCT applications in 2012 and 2013 in the world.4 In 2014, the number of invention
patents per 10,000 inhabitants further climbed up to 4.9, patent applications filed by
Chinese entities through PCT reached 24,007, an annual increase of 14.9%.5
According to one study by staffers of the State Intellectual Property Office
(SIPO),7 between 2007 and 2011, investment in fixed assets by patent-intensive
industries in China made up 19.3% of the total investments in non-agricultural
sectors; the paid-out salary equaled 18.8% of the total salaries of all workers; an
average of 32.9 million new jobs were created annually, employing 25.6% of the
total work force in non-agricultural sectors. In 2011, patent-intensive industries in
China produced a total value of RMB 13 trillion, making up 25.1% of the GDP
(in the US, the 2010 figure stands at 34.8%). Added together, these show that
highly patent-intensive industries employed more labor while invested less, clearly
2Office of the Inter-Ministerial Joint Meeting for Implementation of the NIPS, On the Eve of the
6th Anniversary of the NIPS (in Chinese), available at http://www.nipso.cn/zhuanti/zl6/
3 Chronical of the 5th Anniversary of the NIPS (in Chinese), available at: http://www.sipo.gov.cn/
mtjj/2013/201306/t20130605_801919.html
4 SIPO, 2013 IPRS Protection in China (in Chinese), 2014; Office of the Inter-Ministerial Joint
Meeting for Implementation of the NIPS, On the Eve of the 6thAnniversary of the NIPS.
5 SIPO, News release from the press conference held on 11 February 2015.
IPRs in China—Market-Oriented Innovation or Policy-Induced Rent-Seeking? 163
exhibiting the labor-intensive characteristics. Currently the comparative advantages
of Chinese patent-intensive industries still hinge on labor-intensity, illuminating
China’s initial stage of transforming from labor-intensive to technology-intensive
industry.6
1.3.2 Trademarks and Geographical Indications
In 2012, the total trademark applications reached 1.648 million, an annual increase
rate of 16.3%; registered trademarks reached 1.227 million, an 1.8% increase as
compared to 2011; the accumulated registered trademarks hit 6.4 million, occupy-
ing the world’s first place; trademark applications filed through the Madrid Union
by Chinese entities reached 2100, seventh in world ranking; the in-bound trademark
applications filed through Madrid Union into China reached 20,121, surpassing any
other country; the total number of registered geographical indications (GI) reached
1754, among which 42 were foreign; registered trademarks for agricultural products
in aggregate reached a staggering 1.2815 million.7 In 2013, the applications for
trademark totaled 1.882 million, world number one for 12 years in a row; the total
number of registered GI reached 2190; registered trademarks for agricultural
products in aggregate rose to 1.4473 million.8
1.3.3 Copyrights
In 2012, the registered copyrights reached 687,651, a 49.05% annual increase;
registered software hit 139,228, a 27.33% annual jump—both are historical highs.9
Registered copyrights reached one million in 2013, among which there were
845,064 non-software-related works and 164,349 software items;mortgaged copy-
rights reached 244, an annual increase of 67.12%.10
6 Lee Fonxin et al., Statistical Report on Patent Concentration of Chinese Industries (in Chinese),
9 Science Focus, No. 1 (2014), 15.
7 SIPO, 2012 IPRS Protection in China (in Chinese), 2013.
8 SIPO, 2013 IPRs Protection in China; Office of the Inter-Ministerial Joint Meeting for Imple-
mentation of the NIPS, On the Eve of the 6thAnniversary of the NIPS.
9 SIPO, 2012 IPRs Protection in China.
10 SIPO, 2013 IPRs Protection in China; Office of the Inter-Ministerial Joint Meeting for Imple-
mentation of the NIPS, On the Eve of the 6thAnniversary of the NIPS.
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According to WIPO’s definition, copyright-based industries are those in which
copyright plays an identifiable role in creating tradable private economic rights and
income from the use of those rights. These industries are classified into four broad
groups of copyright activities for statistical measurement: the core copyright
industries,11 the interdependent copyright industries,12 the partial copyright indus-
tries13 and the non-dedicated support industries.14
According to WIPO’s study, the statistics for the economic contributions of
Chinese copyright-based industries to the national economy are as follows: in 2004,
the value added reached RMB 788.4 billion or 4.9% of GDP; 6.16 million people or
5.6% of workers employed; total exports reached US$92.2 billion or 15.5% of
national gross export value; in 2006, the value added reached RMB 1319.7 billion
or 6.4% of GDP; 7.63 million people or 6.5% of workers employed; total exports
reached US$149.3 billion or 15.4% of national gross export value.15 According to a
study conducted by the Chinese Academy of Press and Publication (commissioned
by the National Copyright Administration), in 2011 the value added reached RMB
3152.8 billion or 6.67% of GDP (11.16% of GDP) in the USA; 11.78 million
people or 8.18% of workers employed.16
11 Nine groups of core copyright industries, according to product or service, are recommended to
be included in any survey:(a) press and literature;(b) music, theatrical productions, operas;
(c) motion picture and video;(d) radio and television;(e) photography;(f) software and databases;
(g) visual and graphic arts;(h) advertising services; and (i) copyright collective management
societies. See WIPO, Guide on the Surveying in Economic Contribution of the Copyright-Based
Industries, 2003, paragraph 111.
12 The first group – core interdependent copyright industries – includes manufacture, wholesale
and retail (sales and rental) of TV sets, radios, VCRs, CD players, DVD players, cassette players,
electronic game equipment and other similar equipment; computers and equipment; and musical
instruments. The second group of interdependent copyright industries – partially interdependent
copyright industries – covers manufacture, wholesale and retail (sales and rental) of photographic
and cinematographic instruments; photocopiers; blank recording material; and paper. WIPO,
Guide on the Surveying in Economic Contribution of the Copyright-Based Industries, paragraphs
129, 131.
13 The partial copyright industries are industries in which a portion of the activities is related to
works and other protected subject matter and may involve creation, production and manufacturing,
performance, broadcast, communication and exhibition or distribution and sales. WIPO, Guide on
the Surveying in Economic Contribution of the Copyright-Based Industries, paragraph 133.
14 The non-dedicated support industries are industries in which a portion of the activities is related
to facilitating broadcast, communication, distribution or sales of works and other protected subject
matter, and whose activities have not been included in the core copyright industries. WIPO, Guide
on the Surveying in Economic Contribution of the Copyright-Based Industries, paragraph 139.
15WIPO, The Economic Contribution of Copyright-Based Industries in China, 2009, 13.
16 Chinese Academy of Press and Publication, “Economic Contribution of Chinese Copyright
Industries 2011 (in Chinese),”issued on 18 April 2014, available at: http://www.gapp.gov.cn/
govpublic/96/201987.shtml
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1.3.4 Plant Variety Rights and Integrated Circuit Layout Designs
The development in the area of plant varieties is stable and not sky-rocketing. In
2012, China ranked as world number two in its annual filing among members of the
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV). The
Ministry of Agriculture received 1361 applications for new plant varieties, with the
accumulated applications exceeding 10,000. The Forest Bureau (FB) received
148 applications for forest varieties, among which 26 originated from abroad, and
granted 169 plant variety rights, making the number of total grants 500.17 2013
witnessed no increase, with the relevant figures unchanged: 1333 applications for
new plant varieties. The FB received 162 applications for forest varieties, among
which 8 originated from abroad, and granted 158 plant variety rights, making the
number of total grants 658.18 In 2012 there were 1778 applications for registration
of integrated circuit layout designs, and 1629 certificates were issued.19 Those
numbers became 1561 and 1612, respectively, in 2013.20
1.4 The Exploitation of IPR
According to official sources, there have been 88,050 registered patent licensing
agreements between 2008 and 2012; patent, trademark and copyright mortgage
reached RMB 40 billion, 21.46 billion and 2.751 billion, respectively.21 In 2013
alone, patent financing increased 80% to RMB 25.4 billion; with the launch of
patent insurance, 3530 enterprises nationwide have insured 1855 patents against
total damages of RMB 64.38 million.22
1.5 A More Complete System of Laws and Regulation
The third revision to the Patent Act was effectuated on 27 December 2008 and came
into force on 1 October 2009. Among others, the revision heightens the threshold
for patent grant, increases the penalties for infringing patent and introduces preser-
vation of the status quo order prior to bringing law suits and statutory damages. A
17 SIPO, 2012 IPRS Protection in China.
18 SIPO, 2013 IPRS Protection in China.
19 SIPO, 2012 IPRS Protection in China.
20 SIPO, 2013 IPRS Protection in China; Office of the Inter-Ministerial Joint Meeting for Imple-
mentation of the NIPS, On the Eve of the 6thAnniversary of the NIPS.
21 SIPO, 2012 IPRS Protection in China.
22 SIPO, 2013 IPRs Protection in China; Office of the Inter-Ministerial Joint Meeting for Imple-
mentation of the NIPS, On the Eve of the 6thAnniversaryof the NIPS.
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new round of revision to the Patent Act has been under way since 2012. The third
revision to the Trademark Act, effective since 1 May 2014, recognizes sound as
registrable trademark, prohibits the use of “well-known marks” in association with
sale advertisements and sharply increases punishment for “free-riding” on famous
brands. “In order to sufficiently solve new copyright problems arising from the new
era and to provide forceful protection to cultural prosperity, the third revision of the
Copyright Act was initiated in July 2011and is “now progressing rigorously and in
an orderly manner.”23
1.6 IP Courts
To achieve the goal of significantly improving the protection of IPRs, the People’s
Supreme Court resolved on 27 October 2014 to establish three intermediate IP
Courts in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, each with jurisdiction over adminis-
trative and civil cases (excluding criminal cases) over IP cases and unfair compe-
tition law-related cases (excluding anti-monopoly cases). These three courts have
all been established and became operational by December 2014 at the latest. It is
still too early to evaluate the actual effects of such specialized courts.
2 Major Problems in the Development of Chinese IPR
Industries
The official data and reports tend to focus on and cover only the progress or
achievement of numerical goals set by the NIPS, and risk being a typical self-
reinforcing feature of state organs and propaganda. Therefore the following section
takes a more critical view of the actual achievement of the NIPS and strives to
pinpoint the problems and deficiency in the development of Chinese IPR industries.
2.1 Existing Major Problems and Deficiency
2.1.1 The Non-existence of IPR Valuation Mechanisms
A creditable valuation mechanism is the precondition for the exploitation of IPR to
be for real, but is extremely difficult to establish. Without this, the impressive
figures of 88,050 registered patent licensing agreements, RMB 40 billion,
23 Ibid. But nothing much has been heard about its progress since the third draft was announced
in 2012.
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21.46 billion and 2.751 billion worth of patents, trademarks and copyright mort-
gages, 25.4 billion worth of patent financing, and the 1855 patent insurance policies
against a total damages of 64.38 million could very well be baseless and even
artificially inflated, a mirage created and supported by national institutions. Given
that official reports made no mention of an IPR valuation mechanism and that if
China managed to achieve something unachievable for the West it would hardly be
kept under wraps, it is reasonable to infer that there is no such mechanism in place
in China. Without a trustworthy valuation mechanism, it is not verifiable whether
the goal of having “a number of high-quality new plant variety rights and high-level
integrated circuits layout designs” has been realized at all.
2.1.2 State-Run Enterprises Perform Poorly in Creating Invention
Patents
State-run enterprises account for a significant part of the Chinese economy. How-
ever, they score low in terms of creating invention patents. One study shows that in
2009, state-run enterprises spent RMB 263.3 billion on scientific and technological
activities, which was 2.1% of their total revenue and 31.8% of national expenditure
on R&D, but the resultant invention patents accounted for only 7.5% of the national
grants.24
2.1.3 Domestic Market and R&D Entities Plagued by Overflow of Low
Quality IPR and Lack of Core Competitiveness
1. Patent and Technological Innovation
In recent years, China has indeed become patent-rich, but is not yet a patent-
strong country for the following reasons:
(a) Lack of Core Patents and Technology
One study alleges that 95% of Chinese enterprises do not have their own patents,
and less than three of every ten thousand of them hold core technology patents; in
the areas of aviation and aeronautics, high-definition TV, communication, elec-
tronics and automobiles, 80–90% of the Chinese invention patents are owned by
foreign companies.25 According to the “2011–12 Annual Report on Chinese Digital
Publishing Industry” by the Chinese Academy of Press and Publication, China
24Huang Danhua (Vice Chairman of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission of the State Council), Report Made on the 2010 Working Meeting of Science and
Technology R&D by Enterprises Run by the Central Government, available at http://www.sasac.
gov.un/n1180/n1211/n2725/n4697/12368602.htm1
25Wu Handong, Assessment of the Construction of IP Legal System and Some Reflections
(in Chinese), 2009 China Legal Science (in Chinese), No. 1, 62.
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lacks R&D on core technology that would directly boost the digital publishing
industry. As a result, imitation has become prevalent in all components of the value
chain; manufacture of end devices, provision of contents and the establishment of
platforms have become highly homogenous, price wars and over competition
emerge regularly.26 The “2013–14 Annual Report on Chinese Digital Publishing
Industry” admits that the digital publishing industry lacks an innovative and
sustainable business model despite showing rigorous development in 2013.27
(b) Unreasonable Distributional Structure of Patents
In 2012, invention patents constituted only 17.3% (some 217,000 in total) of the
1.255 million patents that were granted in China.28 By the end of 2011, Chinese
companies held only 50.4% of the total 697,000 valid invention patents, a percent-
age that will further shrink after taking into account the fact that many Chinese
companies are controlled by foreign enterprises. Among the top 30 patentees, 15 are
foreign (including Taiwanese) companies.29 The percentage of invention patents
will be reduced to only 15.3% and the percentage of foreign-owned invention
patents increased to 79.1% if calculated from the total granted valid patents.30
The problem of low percentage of invention patents exists also in the patent
structure of Chinese enterprises. In 2010, multinationals such as Mitsubishi and
Siemens have more than 80% of their patent portfolio in China as invention
patents, whereas the Chinese Haier Group31and Midea Group32 have only
15.6–1.6%, respectively. The percentage of invention patents held by Chinese
automobile industry is equally disappointing: the 98% of GM and 66% of Toyota
stand in stark contrast to the less than 8% of Chery Automobile,33,34 and the even
lower 3.4% of Changan Automobile.35
26 Chinese Academy of Press and Publication, 2011–2012 Annual Report on Chinese Digital
Publishing Industry (in Chinese).
27 Ibid.
28 Zhu Xuezhong, Dialectic Perspective of the Quantity and Quality of Chinese Patents
(in Chinese), 28 Bulletin of Chinese Academy of Sciences (in Chinese),No. 4, 436(2013).
29 Zhu ibid.
30 SIPO, 2011 Annual Report on Valid Patents (in Chinese).
31 According to its own website (http://www.haier.com/us/about-haier/), the Haier Group is the
world’s #1 major appliance brand as ranked by Euromonitor International 2013, and a global
leader in consumer electronics.
32 According to its own website (http://midea.com.sg/about-us/), Midea has from its establishment
in 1968 developed into the world’s largest producer of consumer appliances.
33 According to its own website (http://www.chery.cn/into) Chery Automobile is allegedly the
number one car manufacturer in China, with a total accumulated sale of 4.5 million cars, among
which 1 million were exported.
34 According to its own website (http://www.globalchangan.com/About/), in 2010 Changan Auto-
mobile’s own-brand production ranked No.13 in the world, and No.1 in China. In 2011Changan
Automobile’s brand value reached RMB 30.515 billion yuan, among the top 10 most valuable
brands in China.
35 SIPO, 2011 Annual Report on Valid Patents.
IPRs in China—Market-Oriented Innovation or Policy-Induced Rent-Seeking? 169
In addition, patent applications filed through PCT are extremely unevenly
distributed and heavily concentrated in certain industries, regions and enterprises.
In 2011, the total PCT patent applications from China were 17,473, from which
45.4% (7933) originated from the special economic zone Shenzhen. Huawei36 and
the ZTE Corporation37account for 58.7% of the patent applications filed from
Shenzhen and 26.7% of the total filed applications.38
(c) Low Commercialization of Patents and Technologies
One of the weaknesses of Chinese technological innovation and its implement-
ation of the NIPS lies in insufficient industrial exploitation and commercial-
ization.39 The commercialization rate remains a stubbornly low 5%, even 4 years
after the revision of the Science and Technology Progress Act in 2007,40 whereas
in some developed countries the rate allegedly reaches 80%.41
One critical indicator for the exploitation and commercialization of patents is the
length of paying for patent annuity. The longer the annuity is paid, the longer the
period for patents to result in economic benefits, and the higher their market value.
In 2011, 54.3% of the valid invention patents in China has paid an annuity for less
than 5 years, compared with a low 15.2% in target foreign countries; only 4.8%of
the Chinese valid invention patents has paid annuity for more than 10 years,
whereas that figure in target foreign countries jumped to 24.7%. In 2011, the
average annuity paid in China was for 5.7 years, contrasting with a much longer
8.7 year period in target foreign countries; invention patents maintained by foreign
companies for longer than 10 years are four times more than those maintained by
Chinese companies.42 The 2012 figures were largely unchanged: 5.5% of the valid
Chinese invention patents has paid annuity more than 10 years, whereas that figure
jumped to 26.1% in target foreign countries. In 2014, the average annuity paid by
local invention patentee increased to 6 years, still much lower than the average
9.4 years of annuity paid by foreign patentees.43
36 Huawei is not a publicly listed company. According to http://www.wikiwand.com/zh-tw/华为,
Huawei has a revenue of RMB 240 billion in 2013.
37 According to its own website (http://wwwen.zte.com.cn/en/about/), the ZTE Corporation is a
globally-leading provider of telecom equipment and network solutions, with operations in
160 countries, and a leader in technology innovation all over the world.
38 Zhu, Dialectic Perspective of the Quantity and Quality of Chinese Patents (in Chinese), at 436.
39 Feng Xiaoqing, On How to Facilitate Chinese Enterprises to Converge Technological Innova-
tion and IPRS Strategy (in Chinese), 2014Heilonjiang Social Sciences, No.143(2nd Issue),104.
40Wang Honru, No Chinese University Would Be Ranked as One of the Top 50 Patentee
Universities (in Chinese), 2011China Economic Weekly, Issue 46, 46.
41 Zhang Jiaxin, How to Look at the Commercialization Ratio of Scientific and Technological
Advancement (Chinese), China Science Daily, 10 March 2011, 1.
42 SIPO, 2011 Annual Report on Patents in Force; Luginbuehl, Patent Law in Greater China, 1.27.
43 SIPO, News release from the press conference held on 11 February 2015.
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In 2013, the UK Intellectual Property Office has exposed the low commercial-
ization of patents held by Chinese enterprises in graphene.44 It reports that begin-
ning from 2008, Chinese applicants started patenting graphene. That year their
applications made up only 4% of the worldwide patent families. In just 3 years that
figure increased more than ten times to 49% in 2011. 76.5% of the graphene
patents from Chinese applicants have come from academia and are all narrowly
focused on the preparation of graphene. 95% of their graphene patents have only
one family member compared to 70% worldwide, and in over 98% of these
patents, the single family member is a Chinese patent application. Only 0.6% of
graphene patents from Chinese applicants have more than five family members
compared to 4.2% worldwide. This means that many graphene patents from
Chinese applicants are only going to have protection (once granted) in China and
nowhere else worldwide.45
2. Trademarks and Brands
Chinese enterprises are facing a range of problems in developing trademarks and
brands, as evidently reflected in the small number of high-value and internationally
competitive well-known marks and in the weak brand awareness as well. “The Best
(100) Global Brands” published by Business Week and Interbrand46 led to the
popular practice of ranking brands according to different criteria, such as regional
and national (e.g. BrandZ), and business sectors (e.g. Brand Finance).47
So far only two Chinese brands have been included in the Best Global Brands
published by Interbrand.48 However, surprisingly, eleven Chinese brands are
included in the “Top 100 Most Valuable Brands 2015 Report” published by
BrandZ. There is no doubt that those brands are well known in China and therefore
possess high market value. But most of them are insulated from external compe-
tition, therefore inward-looking and not truly global, whether Tencent and BeiDou
44According to the study of UK IPO, Graphene--The worldwide patent landscape in 2013,
1, Graphene has staggering material properties: the thinnest known material in the universe and
the strongest ever measured; it is elastic and can stretch up to 20% of its length; it is a very efficient
electrical conductor, at room temperature it can sustain current densities six orders of magnitude
higher than that of copper; its charge carriers have the highest intrinsic mobility; it has the best
thermal conductivity of any material; and it is the most impermeable material ever discovered.
45 UK IPO, supra note 43, at 25–27.However, some commentators overwhelmed by the sheer number
are asserting that “theMiddle Kingdom is on the right path to becoming the worldwidemarket leader
in certain technological fields, such as graphene.” See Luginbuehl, supra note 1, at 1.36.
46 According to its own website (http://interbrand.com/en/about/), Interbrand was established in
1974, and is the world’s leading brand consultancy, with a network of 33 offices in 27 countries.
47 But some ranking seems to be dubious, such as the “Most Valuable 500 Brands in China”
published by the “World Brand Lab,” which exhibited strong irregularity (sharp fluctuation of
brand values, some brands simply disappeared and mysteriously reappeared etc.) http://www.
baike.com/wiki/世界品牌实验室
48 Huawei was ranked by the Interbrand as 88th in the 100 Best Global Brands 2015 with an
estimated brand value of US$4.96 billion; Lenovo ranked 100th with estimated brand value of
US$4.1 billion.
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(Internet companies), China Mobile and China Telecom (communications carriers),
Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited, China Con-
struction Bank, and Agricultural Bank of China (banks) or Pingan Insurance and
China Life (insurance).49 As a result, their value and competitiveness could be
seriously inflated. As Interbrand bluntly points out in the Best Global Brands 2013
report, “Chinese brands with global aspirations can take important cues from
others, but to truly succeed, they must find their own way forward through inno-
vation and sound brand strategy.”50
In the export industry, 70% of the top 200 exporters in China work under
OEM/ODM arrangement. 90% of the joint-capital enterprises use brands owned
by foreign investors. Those two figures aptly exemplify the lack of brand awareness
in China.51
3. Copyright Industries52
As a whole, Chinese copyright industries are faced with the following difficul-
ties: (1). Structural imbalance of goods exports. According to Customs statistics,
China exported in 2011 US$ 286 billion worth of copyright-based products, of
which the core copyright industries made up only US$ 5.32 billion, less than 2%
(1.86%). The interdependent copyright industries made up 90.45% and the partial
copyright industries 7.69% of the exported goods. These figures indicate that the
export of copyright-based products relies on manufacturing. (2) Structural imbal-
ance of services exports. The export volume of services involving the core copy-
right industries is meager US$8.238 billion, making up 4.53% of the total services
exports, and only 0.65% of the total exports. (3) Long-term deficit in copyright
trade.53
Digital publication in China faces mounting obstacles and low development,
lacking new products and core technology. One report suggests that in 2012 while
the US, European countries and Japan claim 43%, 34% and 10% of the world
49WIPO takes a neutral stance towards BrandZ’s report; see WIPO, Brands–Reputation and Image
in the Global Marketplace, 2013, 41–44.
50 Leslie Butterfield, China’s New Brand Leaders, in the Best Global Brands 2013, 76.
51Wu, supra note 25, at 62.
52 Singapore is probably the first Asian country carrying out a survey of copyright-based industries
in terms of the economy with WIPO’s approach. See Leo Kah Mun, Chow Kit Boey, Lee Kee
Beng, Ong Chin Huat, Loy Wee Loon: The Economic Contribution of Copyright-Based Industries
in Singapore: The 2004 Report, WIPO National Studies on Assessing the Economic Contribution
of the Copyright-Based Industries (WIPO Publication No.624e 2006), available at: http://www.ip
academy.com.sg/site/ipa_cws/resource/executive%20summaries/Economic_Contribution_2007_
Exec_Summary_Oct%202008.pdf
53 Ibid.
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cultural market share respectively, China commands less than 4%, one tenth of that
of the US.54
2.2 Alienation of and Rent-Seeking Through IPRs
It is foreseeable what the overemphasis of IPRs at the national level in an author-
itarian country such as China will lead to, considering the fact that China is also
the driver of an amazing economic transformation and achievement: alienation
and abuse of IPRs. Due to their intangible and territorial nature, IPRs can be
used by sovereign states as a virtual currency (like Bitcoins). Although turning
gradually towards market mechanisms, China remains a determined party-regime.
The planning, deciding, implementing and justifying of national strategy are
in principle circular, self-serving and self-reinforcing. The decision is meant to
vindicate the planning, the implementation is meant to vindicate the planning and
decision, and all become justified in the end. However, people can make unduly
high profits by knowing and gaming the regime to the detriment of public interest –
rent-seeking. In China, there are ample signs of alienation of IPRs and rent-seeking
through IPRs.
2.2.1 Inflation of Junk Patents Induced by Improper Subsidies
and Incentives
Junk patents (including patent applications) are just as common in patent-strong
countries, such as the USA. To curb the unsound patents from proliferating, the
Public Patent Foundation at Benjamin Cardozo School of Law (“PUBPAT”) was
set up to bust undeserved US patents.55 However, junk patents take on a whole new
dimension in China, as they are induced by flawed patent policy and incentive
systems.56 Under the guidance of the NIPS, governments of all levels come up with
all kinds of schemes that regard the number of filed patent applications and granted
patents as Key Performance Indicator (KPI) for any possible evaluation (even for
getting admission into universities, graduation from universities, etc.).57 Higher-
than-fee and indiscriminate subsidies for patent-related fees are being provided for
drafting of applications, filing of applications (whether for invention, utility model
54 Zhang Guozou, Blue Book of Cultural Soft Power (in Chinese), published by Research Center
on the Soft Power of Chinese Culture, Social Sciences in China Press and Social Sciences
Academic Press, 2010.
55 http://www.pubpat.org
56 Luginbuehl, Patent Law in Greater China, at 1.30.
57 Luginbuehl, Patent Law in Greater China, at 1.25.
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or design patent), and for annuity, which contribute to the emergence and sustaining
of junk patents.58 The resultant consequence is a flood of applications even filed by
institutions which obviously have no actual need for using patents, to seek rents
from governments.59
Junk patents are perilous in many ways: (1) Hindering innovation by raising the
costs for others to do further R&D.60 (2) Disturbing market competition and
harming consumers’ interest by asserting rights on competitors and forcing them
to pass the extra costs on to consumers. (3) Wasting public resources by straining
patent examination capacity on and/or judicial resources.61
2.2.2 Bizarre Ways of Creating and Using Well-Known Marks
The protection of well-known marks has gone through at least four stages.62 The
fourth and the latest stage begins with the third revision to the Trademark Act,
effective since 1 May 2014, which prohibits the use of “well-known marks” in
association with sale advertisements. The background for this prohibition lies
exactly in the alienation of and rent-seeking through well-known marks listing.
On the one hand, the Trademark Office (TMO) under the State Administration for
Industry and Commerce and the Trademark Review and Adjudication Board
(TRAB) have the authority to determine well-known marks upon request in appli-
cation or appeal disputes. The TMO publishes on its website well-known marks that
it and the TRAB have recognized at least since 25 February 2004. However, the
publication makes no reference to the cases in which the marks were recognized as
well known. On the other hand, the People’s Intermediate Courts have the right to
recognize well-known marks in disputes involving trademarks and domain names.
In contrast to recognition by the TMO and the TRAB,63 the recognition of a well-
known mark by the People’s Intermediate Courts is only valid for the individual
case and will not be publicized. The listing of well-known marks was misused,
58Wen Jiachun, Study on Local Governments’ Funding of Patent Fees (in Chinese), Huazhong
University of Science and Technology, 2008 Ph.D thesis, 33; Wen Jiachun, Why Patent Fees
Provided by Government Induce Junk Patents and Its Cure (in Chinese), Electronics IP, 2008, 27.
59 Zhu, Dialectic Perspective of the Quantity and Quality of Chinese Patents (in Chinese), at 440.
60 Luginbuehl, China’s Patent Policy, 1.37.
61Wen, Study on Local Governments’ Funding of Patent Fees(in Chinese), at 59.
62 For a detailed description of the first three stages, see Kung-Chung Liu, The Use and Misuse of
Well-Known Marks Listings, 40 International Review of Industrial Property and Competition
Law, 685–697(June 2009).
63 The Rules on the Recognition and Protection of Well-Known Marks of 2003 grants a general
presumptive effect to the recognized well-known marks by allowing the industry and commerce
authorities to rely on the (well-known marks) records in dispute cases, on the conditions that the
scope of protection involved is basically the same and that the opposing party does not dispute that
marks at issue are well-known or disputes without evidence rebutting the renown of the marks
(Art. 12).
174 K.-C. Liu et al.
which led to explosive growth of well-known marks.64 Ads boasting the advertised
brands as “Chinese Well-known Marks” without context and limitation
mushroomed, a phenomenon not seen elsewhere. Intermediary organizations dedi-
cated to the creation of well-known marks have emerged and are brokering between
trademark owners and officials. The 1–2 years taken on average by the TMO and
the TRAB to come to a determination of a well-know mark were deemed too long
by some. A quicker avenue was sought through the courts. Some trademark
disputes were faked, not for the sake of solving disputes but to create “well-
known marks” by colluding judges, which led to rampant corruption.65 Again,
government subsidies and even political fringe benefits were driving all this
distortion.
2.2.3 Alienation of and Rent-Seeking Through Other IPRs
Under such an ecosystem of alienation and rent-seeking and lack of an objective
third party valuation mechanism, it is hard to immunize other IPRs from similar
problems, especially those that are used as quantitative indicators, such as the
658 plant variety rights, 3241 IC layout designs, 164,349 registered software and
845,064 registered copyrights. The only issue would be when and how will those
problems be revealed and exposed.
2.2.4 Absurd Misuse of IP as Reason for Jail Sentence Commutation
Another unheard-of misuse of IP lies probably in the Chinese Criminal Code.
According to Article 78 of the Chinese Criminal Code, the punishment of a criminal
sentenced to public surveillance, criminal detention, fix-termed imprisonment, life
imprisonment may be commuted if, while serving his/her sentence, conscientiously
observes prison regulations, accepts education and reform through labor and shows
the true repentance, or perform meritorious services shall be commuted if he/she
performs any of the following major meritorious services: (3) having made inven-
tion or major technical innovation. After commutation, the term of punishment
actually to be served by those sentenced to public surveillance, criminal detention,
fix-termed imprisonment may not be less than half of the term originally decided;
for those sentenced to life imprisonment, it may not be less than 10 years.
64 From 1996 to October 2010, some 4485 well-known marks have been recognized and
publicized.
65 According to Jui Jin, Attorneys and Judges Colluded to Fake (in Chinese), Nanfan Weekly,
17 December 2009, A04, two judges from Xiangtan Intermediary People’s Court in Hunan
Province were removed from their post because of illegal determination of well-known marks in
exchange for personal profit in 2009.
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However, the Criminal Code does not define what constitute invention or “major
technical innovation”, nor has it been uniformly determined by the authorities on
how to ascertain who the actual inventor or innovator was and the relationship
between commutation and the types and nature of invention or “major technical
innovation.” As inmates are isolated from the society and can only file for invention
protection through the help of patent agencies, some patent agencies have made
advertisements about providing “one-stop” services to inmates ranging from appli-
cation for invention patents to application for term commutation. The Hong Kong–
based news media Singpao reports that one patent agency in Shaanxi province
charges RMB 6800 for one utility model patent and RMB 50,000–60,000 for one
invention patent.66 According to Xinhua News, the former Vice Chairman of the
Chinese Football Association, Nan Yong, previously convicted of bribery for
10 years and six months, was granted a commutation of 1 year due to invention
he acquired while serving his sentence.67 However, details remained unclear with
regards to the invention Nan Yong had acquired. Sadly, IP has become an instru-
ment for arbitrary discretion of the authorities.
3 Root Cause of the Discussed Problems: Misplaced
Government Functions That Create Rents
3.1 The Vice Starts from the Central Government
The idea of separation of power between governmental agencies and the separation
between government and market is alien to the Chinese communist party, which
assumes a holistic approach towards governance. Government is entitled to inter-
vene in every aspect of market operation, and only too easily. Government takes
upon itself economic responsibility and holds officials accountable for the perfor-
mance of market that is under its tight control. That led to speedy large-scale city
development, infrastructure roll-out and economic growth, but not without huge
costs. In addition to the market failure, public goods nature of IPRs that the
government is supposed to remedy, a government failure of “Chinese character-
istic”emerges. The ubiquitously visible hands of the government constrain the
invisible hands of the market and greatly hinder further social and economic
development.68 It is the government that creates rents, which in turn lures people
66 http://www.singpao.com/xw/nd/201501/t20150120_545854.html
67 http://news.xinhuanet.com/sports/2014-12/06/c_127282087.htm
68He Wei, The Political and Economic Analysis of Rent-seeking (in Chinese, Ph. D thesis of
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics),1998,4;Wu Quoping, The Governmental Role in
the Chinese IPRS Strategy(in Chinese), 16 China Intellectual Property No.6, 39–40(June 2006);
Qin Quozong, Between Not Doing and Doing: Governmental Role under Market Circumstances of
Chinese Characteristic (in Chinese), 2011Fa-zhi-yan-jiu (法治研究), No.5, 58–59.
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to seek rents from the government. In that process money changes hands, IPRs
alienated and diluted.
Government creates rent via providing all kinds of subsidies, monetary rewards
and preferential tax treatment. Rents can also be set by bundling career promotion
of people from the public sector (government agencies, universities, state-run
businesses, party organizations, etc.) with their application for and acquisition of
IPRs. IPRs thus created are not the result of market needs and would therefore not
be exploited commercially, which explains why so many patents granted to uni-
versities were soon abandoned after the grant.69
3.2 Provincial and Local Governments Overdo Everything
The issue of rent-creation worsens in the lower governments. Under a centralized
party state regime, officials are ranked and paid in descending order from central, to
provincial and local governments. As a result, Chinese local officials always look
for promotion to higher governmental levels. Local credentials provide local
officials bargaining power to demand more resources and support from higher-
level governments which in turn could be used as leverage to secure their later
promotion.70 Therefore local governments and officials are incentivized to even
outdo higher-level governments in creating rents, whether in the implementation of
the NIPS or any other national strategies.
4 The Policy for Quality Control of Patents Doomed
to Fail?
In 2014, the Office of the Inter-Ministerial Joint Meeting for Implementation
of the National Intellectual Property Strategy announced “The Promotion Plan
for the Implementation of the National Intellectual Property Strategy in 2014”
(“2014 Promotion Plan”) and listed “Raising the Intellectual Property Creation
Quality” as its top priority among other four goals: improving verification and
evaluation system for IPRs, and raising the pertinence and efficiency of IPR
creation; optimizing the policy orientation for enhancing the quality of patent
applications and strengthening the supervision on the quality of patent applications;
improving examinations of various IP rights, strengthening the quality
69Hu Hua et al., Analysis of Traditional Chinese Culture’s Impact on the Quality of Domestic
Patents (in Chinese), 2010 Science and Technology Management Study, No.16, 255.
70 Hu Hua et al., Analysis of Traditional Chinese Culture’s Impact on the Quality of Domestic
Patents (in Chinese), 254.
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management, raising the examination efficiency; and upgrading the IP creation
capability of innovators and enhancing IP rollout in key fields. It foresees to
undertake the following two measures among others that target the improvement
of patent quality: (1) To implement the “Opinions on Further Improving the Quality
of Patent Applications” promulgated by SIPO, in order to optimize that the
evaluation orientation of regional patents, to improve general patent subsidy policy,
to implement special patent subsidy policy, to stand out the quality orientation of
award policy for patents and to promote the integration of patent quality index into
relevant policies. (2) To establish the oversight system for facilitating the quality
improvement of patent applications, to strengthen the monitoring and handling of
low quality patent applications, to develop the credential database for patent
applicants, to seriously handle the cases involving swindling patent subsidies and
awards and to explore the establishment of the quality monitoring mechanism for
patent applications and its feedback mechanism.
It is fair to say that the “2014 Promotion Plan” acknowledges the issues of low
quality patents and the underlying rent-seeking and that this is to be duly credited to
the Commissioner of the SIPO, Dr. Shen Changyu (since December 2013). How-
ever, it remains to be seen whether the “2014 Promotion Plan” can be implemented
and to what extent by provincial and local governments. What is more worrying is
the “The Action Plan for 2014–2020,” which was released after the “2014 Promo-
tion Plan” and by the highest administrative agency in China, the State Council. It
seems to find itself on a collision tract with the “2014 Promotion Plan” because
although the growth in absolute number of patents is no longer targeted, it sets other
specifically quantified targets: invention patent per 10,000 inhabitants shall keep
rising to 14 in 2020, 2.8 times to grow from the current 4.9 in just less than 6 years!
The average annuity term for invention patent shall be extended to 9 years, a
formidable 50% increase! Once the goals are fixed, it is submitted that the Chinese
governments of all levels will strife to meet those goals at all costs. Logically,
subsidies and fringe benefits of all kinds will be summoned and poured into the
“production” of invention patents and the annuity fee for 9 years will be a stan-
dardized request for and grant of government support. All in all, this can only lead
to the distortion of reality which culminates in 2020!
5 Conclusion
To date, IPRs in China are a mixture of market-oriented innovation and policy-
induced rent-seeking. There is no quantifiable mechanism to measure the exact
composition of the mixture, however arguably the latter overtakes the former. “The
Action Plan for 2014–2020” will inevitably magnify the policy-induced rent-
seeking activities. Although it’s high time for China to conduct a mid-term review
and reality check of the NIPS and all of its ramifications after 7 years of imple-
mentation, one would doubt whether it stands any chance to correct the wrong path,
given the gravity of the “The Action Plan for 2014–2020.” All odds
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notwithstanding, the international IP community should provide help to China to
conduct a neutral mid-term review. It is also incumbent on the international IP
community to remind China that it should act in an IP-ecosystem friendly way by
reducing the production and emission of junk IPRs to the rest of the world.
This chapter shows that in terms of quantifiable measurement for evaluating the
success rate of the NIPS, China succeeds in number and ranks as world number one
in filed applications for three kinds of patent since 2010. It is also world leader in
filed applications for trademark registration since 2001 and has an accumulated
registration of 6.4 million trademarks that no other country can rival. However,
China has not fared well in establishing world-famous brands because so far only
two Chinese brands have been included in the more creditable the Best Global
Brands published by Interbrand. Nor has the goal of greatly increasing the GDP
proportion accounted for by core copyright industries been reached, since it only
grew by 0.27% of GDP (from 6.4% of GDP in 2006 to 6.67% in 2011) in 5 years.
In addition, it is hard to ascertain whether the goal for China to own “a number of
high-quality new plant variety rights and high-level integrated circuits layout-
designs” has been neared, and whether the statistics that patent-intensive industries
in China account for 25.1% of the GDP (vs. 34.8% in the USA in 2010) are
creditable, since China lacks IPR valuation mechanisms. It is suggested that the root
cause of the discussed problems lies in the misplaced government functions that
create rents and rent-seeking. It is worth exploring whether the ex ante monetary
subsidies for applied IPRs should be replaced by ex post tax deduction for granted
IPRs71 as a first step to curb rent-seeking. Ex post tax deduction for granted IPRs
has more merits in that it requires companies to have first made genuine trans-
actions and revenues reaching the threshold of having to pay tax before they can file
for tax deduction.
71 In Singapore any fees paid to any IP Office, any agent for IP prosecution, preparation of
specifications and validity or infringement advice are tax-deductible at 100% under the Income
Tax, and 400% deductible under the Productivity and Innovation Credit Scheme; see IPOS, IP
Hub Master Plan, 2013, 4.2.12.
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